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A stakeholder model in economic geography: perception and
management of environmental stakeholders in German
manufacturing companies
Abstract
n this paper we aim to show that stakeholder theory can enrich analysis in (environmental) economic
geography. By applying and modifying the stakeholder salience model from  management studies, we
analyse which factors influence company managers in their environmental decision-making and which
priorities they give to competing stakeholder claims.  We test the model on data from 250 German
manufacturing firms. Overall, the results strongly support the basic assumptions of stakeholder theory.
They indicate that stakeholder attributes such as legitimacy, power and urgency and the stakeholders'
willingness to cooperate are more important for stakeholder salience than company- and product-related
characteristics. Moreover, the results confirm the findings of a recent study of Spanish man-  ufacturing
firms by Gago and Antolín. 
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ABSTRACT
In this paper we aim to show that stakeholder theory can enrich analysis in (environmental)
economic geography. By applying and modifying the stakeholder salience model from
management studies, we analyse which factors influence company managers in their envi-
ronmental decision-making and which priorities they give to competing stakeholder claims.
We test the model on data from 250 German manufacturing firms. Overall, the results
strongly support the basic assumptions of stakeholder theory. They indicate that stakehold-
er attributes such as legitimacy, power and urgency and the stakeholders’ willingness to co-
operate are more important for stakeholder salience than company- and product-related
characteristics. Moreover, the results confirm the findings of a recent study of Spanish man-
ufacturing firms by Gago and Antolín.
KEY WORDS: stakeholder theory, environmental management, manufacturing, environ-
mental economic geography
ZUSAMMENFASSUNG
Das Ziel dieses Beitrags ist es aufzuzeigen, dass die aus den Managementwissenschaften
stammende Stakeholder-Theorie eine Bereicherung für die (umweltorientierte)
Wirtschaftsgeographie sein kann. Anhand eines modifizierten Stakeholder Salience-
Modells wird untersucht, welche Faktoren Manager von Unternehmen bei Umweltschutz-
Entscheidungen beeinflussen und welche Prioritäten sie konkurrierenden Forderungen ein-
räumen. Das Modell wird anhand der Daten von 250 deutschen Industrieunternehmen
empirisch getestet. Insgesamt bestätigen die Ergebnisse zentrale Annahmen der
Stakeholder-Theorie. Sie zeigen, dass den Anspruchsgruppen zugewiesene Eigenschaften
wie Legitimität, Durchsetzungsfähigkeit, Dringlichkeit und Kooperationsbereitschaft für
deren Wahrnehmung im Unternehmensmanagement deutlich wichtiger sind als strukturelle
Merkmale der betroffenen Unternehmen und ihrer Produkte. Die Ergebnisse bestätigen
auch weitgehend die Befunde einer neueren Studie von Gago und Antolín zu spanischen
Industrieunternehmen.
SCHLÜSSELWÖRTER: Stakeholder-Theorie, Anspruchsgruppen, Umweltmanagement,
verarbeitendes Gewerbe, umweltorientierte Wirtschaftsgeographie
In this paper we aim to show that stake-holder theory can enrich analysis in eco-
nomic geography. We do this by present-
ing and testing a model that explains how
managers perceive and manage their
environmental stakeholders, i.e. stake-
holders who raise environmental claims.
Particularly newer approaches in econom-
ic geography, which regard economic
action as embedded within social relation-
ships, can gain from stakeholder theory. 
To show how stakeholder theory can
improve the understanding of the firm in
its business environment in geography,
we will focus on approaches recently
developed in the field of environmental
economic geography (see for a summary
Braun, 2003). In these approaches stake-
holder theory plays an important role for
the following reasons: (a) The manage-
ment of a firm takes decisions or actions
that have a positive or negative effect on
the environment; however, these deci-
sions or actions are motivated, driven,
supported – basically constructed – by
many competing stakeholder claims
(DiMaggio and Powell, 1983). (b) Firms’
environmentally harmful operations often
mobilise stakeholders to protest against
these firms; usually companies somehow
react to these stakeholder protests. How
managers perceive and deal with their
stakeholders therefore can also de- or
increase a company’s negative effect on
the natural environment. 
There is considerable debate about who
actually is a stakeholder. According to
Freeman (1984) a stakeholder is «any
group or individual who can affect or is
affected by the achievement of the orga-
nization’s objectives». Attempting to bring
an ethical perspective into management
studies, the stakeholder concept has
been discussed and incorporated into
economics throughout the past 20 years
(see e.g. Donaldson and Preston, 1995;
Freeman, 1984; Matikainen, 1994;
Mitchell et al., 1997; for a critical account
see Friedman, 1997). But only lately it has
been taken up by economic geographers
(e.g. Braun, 2003; Glasze and Zöller,
1998; Schulz, 2005; Zöller, 2005).
Managers usually automatically apply the
stakeholder concept, when they choose
to which of their stakeholders they will pay
attention. Freeman’s «principle of who or
what really counts» asks for the reasons
why a manager chooses to deal with cer-
tain stakeholders, and not with others.
The principle poses two questions: (a)
Who (or what) are the stakeholders of the
firm? (b) To whom (or what) do managers
pay attention? In this paper we are inter-
ested in the latter question – i.e. what
determines environmental stakeholder
salience, «the degree to which managers
give priority to competing claims»
(Mitchell et al., 1997, 869). We do not pri-
marily want to know which stakeholders
managers regard as important but rather
inquire theoretically, under which condi-
tions managers consider certain classes
of entities as (relevant) stakeholders.
Results of this kind of study can help to
predict managers’ interaction with stake-
holders – the findings can thus support
managers to select the stakeholders they
should deal with, and can also help
stakeholder groups to identify more effec-
tive methods to approach managers with
their environmental claims. From a more
conceptual perspective our study may
serve to advance stakeholder salience
theory within economics and economic
geography. 
We will proceed as follows: After briefly
presenting and enhancing stakeholder
salience theory, we will discuss the model
we use. We base our model on the stake-
holder salience model by Mitchell et al.
(1997). In their theory they suggest that
three stakeholder attributes – power, legit-
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INTRODUCTION
imacy, urgency – affect stakeholder
salience and influence managerial deci-
sions. However, we add another attribute
into the model and also integrate compa-
ny- and product-related characteristics;
we test how all these factors modify the
managers’ perception of their stakehold-
ers. To test our model empirically we use
survey data of 250 German manufactur-
ers as well as bi- and multivariate statisti-
cal analysis. We will finish by presenting
and discussing the results. 
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THEORY AND HYPOTHESES – 
STAKEHOLDER IDENTIFICATION AND SALIENCE 
ENVIRONMENTAL STAKEHOLDER
SALIENCE AND MANAGEMENT STUDIES 
There is hardly disagreement on who
counts as potential stakeholder – individu-
als, groups, organisations, the neighbour-
hood etc. However, the pragmatic reality
is that managers simply cannot attend to
all potential claims of their stakeholders.
Applying stakeholder theory, the literature
in management studies recently dis-
cussed fundamental questions for man-
agers like: Which stakeholder groups
deserve management attention, and
which do not? How much time and money
shall managers spend on one particular
stakeholder? How do managers deter-
mine to whom they will allocate time? In
short, the discussion on the definition of
stakeholders is centred on how to narrow
the stakeholder definition without neglect-
ing important stakeholders in the business
environment (for a comprehensive sum-
mary see Mitchell et al., 1997).  
The most comprehensive attempt to pin-
point the question «who or what really
counts?» is undertaken by Mitchell et al.
(1997) in their paper on stakeholder iden-
tification and salience. Their paper is an
attempt to extract factors that determine
stakeholder salience – i.e. «the degree to
which managers give priority to compet-
ing stakeholder claims» (Mitchell et al.,
1997, 869). They suggest that three attrib-
utes – power, legitimacy, urgency – deter-
mine why a manager pays more attention
to stakeholder x in his business environ-
ment than to stakeholder y. According to
this theory, stakeholder salience is a func-
tion of one, two, or all three of the attribut-
es power, urgency, and legitimacy. The
number of attributes that a manager per-
ceives as relevant with regard to one par-
ticular stakeholder will determine this
stakeholder’s salience. The more attribut-
es managers assess as strong, the higher
the salience of this particular stakeholder. 
The question, which stakeholders a man-
ager interacts with, is very much depen-
dent on the issues under consideration.
We will focus on environmental issues,
very similarly to what Gago and Antolín
(2004) did in their empirical study on
stakeholder salience of Spanish manufac-
turing companies. We will thus examine
environmental stakeholder attributes and
their influence on environmental stake-
holder salience, i.e. we look at why man-
agers give priority to certain stakeholders
in their business environment regarding
environmental issues. 
Environmental power of stakeholders
Mitchell et al. (1997) define stakeholder
power through resource dependence the-
ory: Stakeholder x has power over a com-
pany, if he can make the company do
things that it would not have done without
the influence of stakeholder x (compare
Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978). The use of
power as one element of environmental
stakeholder salience is also supported by
neo-institutional theory from sociology,
which states that coercive pressures
strongly determine managers’ decisions
(DiMaggio and Powell, 1983). Institutional
pressures – or the environmental power of
a stakeholder – can influence the survival
of the company. In the environmental
salience model power influences environ-
mental salience: the more power against a
firm a stakeholder has with his environ-
mental claims, the more attention the firm
will pay to them. Consequently, our first
hypothesis is:
H 1: The stronger a manager per-
ceives a stakeholder’s environmental
power, the higher the stakeholder’s envi-
ronmental salience. 
Environmental legitimacy of a stakeholder
Mitchell et al. (1997) show that many def-
initions of the term stakeholder imply the
notion of legitimacy, which integrates a
normative aspect into the term stakehold-
er and the concept of stakeholder
salience. They use Suchman’s (1995) def-
inition: «a generalized perception or
assumption that the actions of an entity
are desirable, proper, or appropriate with-
in some socially constructed system of
norms, values, beliefs, and definitions».
Legitimacy is often connected to power,
i.e. a manager will not very likely deal with
a powerful actor, whom he does not
regard as legitimate. We derive our sec-
ond hypothesis from this definition: 
H 2: The higher a manager perceives
a stakeholder’s environmental legitimacy,
the higher the stakeholder’s environmen-
tal salience. 
Environmental urgency of a stakeholder 
Mitchell et al. (1997) have included
urgency into their concept in order to
move the model from static to dynamic.
They argue that urgency is based on the
following two attributes: (1) time sensitivi-
ty – the degree to which managerial delay
in attending to the claims or relationship is
unacceptable to the stakeholder, and (2)
criticality – the importance of the claim or
relationship to the stakeholder. They
define urgency as: «the degree to which
stakeholder claims call for immediate
action.» Our third hypothesis of environ-
mental stakeholder salience is: 
H 3: The stronger a manager per-
ceives a stakeholder’s environmental
urgency, the higher the stakeholder’s
environmental salience. 
ECONOMIC GEOGRAPHY AND 
STAKEHOLDER THEORY 
The yet unanswered question in econom-
ic geography – to whom (or what) do
managers pay attention – is particularly
important from the perspective of environ-
mental economic geography, as environ-
mental strategies seem to more and more
integrate stakeholder communication.
Most studies in geography that examine
the task environment of companies do not
look much for explanations on the micro-
level, i.e. management (Zöller, 2005).
Those studies that have used the stake-
holder concept on a micro-perspective
have often used Freeman’s term without
questioning its broadness, or they used it
without considering the importance of
societal stakeholders.
However, referring to Gröner and Zapf
(1998), who typify stakeholders according
to their willingness to co-operate and their
potential to influence, Braun (2003) also
stresses the aspect of co-operation. From
our perspective, Mitchell et al. (1997)
have neglected this rather important
aspect in their stakeholder salience con-
cept, as much environmental improve-
ment today works through learning in
partnerships. Therefore, we suggest
broadening the stakeholder salience con-
cept through the (environmental) stake-
holder attribute willingness to co-operate
with the firm (on environmental issues).
This leads to our fourth hypothesis: 
H 4: The higher a manager perceives
that a stakeholder is willing to co-operate
on environmental issues (environmental
co-operation), the higher the stakehold-
er’s environmental salience. 
ENVIRONMENTAL STAKEHOLDER
SALIENCE
In accordance to Mitchell et al. (1997)
and enhanced through the above discus-
sion, we can now define environmental
stakeholder salience to be determined by
a combination of four environmental
stakeholder attributes: power, legitimacy,
urgency and willingness to co-operate.
Our fifth hypothesis in correspondence to
Mitchell’s et al. salience theory is (com-
pare also Gago and Antolín, 2004, 68): 
H 5: The accumulation of the attribut-
es environmental power, environmental
legitimacy, environmental urgency and
environmental co-operation will be asso-
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ciated with greater environmental stake-
holder salience. 
INDUSTRY, FIRM AND PRODUCT 
CHARACTERISTICS
In our attempt to explain and test which
factors determine environmental salience
of stakeholders, we go a little further than
either Mitchell et al. (1997) or Gago and
Antolín (2004) did. In their quest to
explain why certain firms adopt environ-
mental management practices beyond
regulatory compliance, Delmas and Toffel
(2004) set up a theoretical framework of
institutional pressures. They argue that
pressure is not perceived by managers as
it is, but that company and plant charac-
teristics moderate the way how managers
perceive their stakeholders’ claims. Firms
adopt heterogeneous sets of environmen-
tal management practices, they argue,
because plant and company characteris-
tics modify the way they interpret external
claims. In accordance with their sugges-
tion, we assume that the way how man-
agers perceive stakeholder attributes is
mediated by various characteristics refer-
ring to the firm, its location, the products
produced, and also stakeholder charac-
teristics. Our argument is also supported
by the literature that analyses which cam-
paign strategies environmental NGOs fol-
low. According to these studies environ-
mental NGOs select their targets accord-
ing to company- and product-related
characteristics (Hendry, 2003; Frooman
and Murrell, 2005). Thus, we propose the
following hypothesis to be tested in our
model: 
H 6: Company- and product-related
characteristics do positively or negatively
influence environmental stakeholder
salience. 
5BELGEO • 2008 • 3
METHODOLOGY
SAMPLE
In 2006 we conducted a questionnaire
survey of all German manufacturing firms
that are certified according to EMAS
(European Eco-Management and Audit
Scheme). Our objective was to find out
how managers assess different stakehold-
ers and their attributes in relation to envi-
ronmental issues. We selected EMAS-cer-
tified companies, because they can be
assumed to be already sensitised for envi-
ronmental issues. The response rate
obtained was 25 per cent or 250 valid
questionnaires in total (out of about 1.000
firms contacted). The companies that
responded are relatively large in average
(45 per cent have more than 500 employ-
ees, only 21 per cent have less than 50
employees) and can be allocated to the
following industries (Table 1). 
MEASURES OF ENVIRONMENTAL
STAKEHOLDER ATTRIBUTES
We explicitly defined the environmental
stakeholder attributes in the following way
in the questionnaire. The answers were
given on a five-point Likert scale. 
Environmental stakeholder salience:
degree to which managers give priority to
competing stakeholder claims – mea-
sured through the extent of environmental
information exchange with a particular
stakeholder (1 = no information exchange;
5 = very frequent interaction) 
Environmental power: perceived strength of
a stakeholder’s potential demands to influ-
ence management decisions regarding the
protection of the natural environment (1 =
no potential; 5 = very high potential) 
Environmental urgency (demands): per-
ceived strength of a stakeholder’s con-
crete demands to influence management
decisions regarding the protection of the
natural environment (1 = no demands; 5 =
very high demands)
Environmental legitimacy: perceived legiti-
macy of a stakeholder’s demands that are
related to the natural environment (1 = no
legitimacy; 5 = very high legitimacy) 
DESCRIPTIVE ANALYSIS
Each manager evaluated his stakeholders
according to salience and to the four envi-
ronmental attributes power, urgency,
legitimacy, and co-operation. Table I pre-
sents the mean values of the environmen-
tal stakeholder attributes, as perceived by
the managers. Overall, managers evaluat-
ed the attributes highest for five stake-
holders: owners, local governments,
national/state governments, clients, and
employees (compare Table 2). 
Owners have the highest scores for four
attributes; only interaction with employees
on environmental issues (i.e. salience)
had a higher mean score for employees
than for all other stakeholders. This result
differs somewhat from the study by Gago
and Antolín (2004), which shows that
Spanish manufacturing firms perceive the
government as strongest stakeholder for
all attributes. In the Spanish study, owners
even drop to the fourth (legitimacy) and
fifth (urgency) rank. This may indicate that
firm owners in Germany are already more
sensitised for environmental issues than
owners of Spanish firms, and act more
independently from the government in
environmental issues. 
Compared to the other stakeholders, the
local government is perceived as having
strong power and demanding much, fol-
lowed by the clients and national/state
governments. In terms of legitimacy own-
ers, employees and clients stand out, only
Environmental co-operation: willingness
to co-operate on a company’s environ-
ment-related activities (1 = no willingness
to co-operate; 5 = very high willingness to
co-operate)
STATISTICAL TESTS AND MODELS
At first we undertook a descriptive analy-
sis to find out whether some stakeholders
or attributes are more important than oth-
ers. For each attribute, the mean values of
the 14 stakeholders were compared to
see if there were any significant differ-
ences between them. We then carried out
a correlation analysis of the salience of
the different stakeholders in order to find
out if there were any similarities among
the stakeholders.
Through bivariate correlation analysis,
multiple linear regression models and
Kruskal-Wallis tests we tried to explain
environmental stakeholder salience in
terms of their environmental attributes
(power, urgency, legitimacy, co-opera-
tion). Finally, we applied bivariate analy-
ses and logistic regression models in
order to control for the influences of com-
pany- and product-related factors on
environmental salience. 
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Table 1. Firms in the sample by industry.
RESULTS
followed by local and national/state gov-
ernments. The fact that governments are
not regarded as the most legitimate group
shows that many managers tend to
regard business aims as higher than state
regulation. In contrast, owners and
employees are being regarded as the
stakeholders most willing to co-operate,
followed by the local governments and
clients. 
Environmental salience is highest for
employees and owners, i.e. managers
dedicate most time for exchanging envi-
ronmental information with these two
stakeholders. A little surprising in our
results is the high perception of employ-
ees’ environmental salience. It may result
from the fact that managers interact most
often in the day-to-day business of imple-
menting environmental policies with their
employees. Owners might rather define
the broader direction, which requires less
frequent interaction. 
Highly ranked in environmental salience
are also clients and local governments,
followed by national/state governments.
The low mean salience values for
(inter)national environmental groups, and
the moderate values for the government
stakeholders suggests that the most time-
consuming issue is the de-facto imple-
mentation of environmental standards
and management routines, in which envi-
ronmental groups and governments play
a less important role. 
Among all stakeholders, trade unions are
regarded as the least important environ-
mental stakeholders. To our surprise,
national and international NGOs were also
seen as little important with regard to
most environmental attributes. Whereas
their values are rather low in average,
they are somewhat higher in food pro-
cessing and energy/water supply indus-
tries, i.e. directly consumer-oriented ones. 
To find out if there are similarities among
the stakeholders we tested the correla-
tions between environmental stakeholder
salience of the different stakeholders.
Table 3 shows that there were positive
and significant correlations between most
stakeholders. This means that companies
that pay attention to the environmental
demands of a specific stakeholder also
do with most other stakeholders. These
results almost fully correspond to the find-
ings of Gago and Antolín’s (2004) study.
The only stakeholder group that does not
correlate significantly with most other
groups are the owners. Interacting with
owners on environmental issues does
obviously not imply that more interaction
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Table 2. Evaluation of environmental stakeholder attributes (mean values).
 Power Urgency Legitimacy Co-operation Salience 
Employees 3,60 3,17 4,42 4,07 4,14 
Owners 4,50 3,67 4,71 4,19 3,82 
Clients 3,88 3,25 4,26 3,47 3,35 
Local governments 3,97 3,30 4,08 3,50 3,32 
National/state governments 3,87 3,18 4,05 3,26 2,92 
Suppliers 2,30 1,75 2,58 3,05 2,83 
Business associations 2,81 2,29 3,01 3,24 2,77 
Consumers 3,26 2,49 4,02 2,83 2,53 
Local communities 3,41 2,28 4,00 3,00 2,45 
Media 2,98 1,84 2,57 2,68 2,34 
Banks 2,86 2,06 3,25 2,60 2,13 
Local environmentalist groups 2,91 1,75 3,14 2,79 1,89 
Trade unions 2,30 1,55 2,35 2,34 1,71 
(Inter-)National environmentalist groups 2,63 1,53 2,80 2,45 1,62 
N=250      
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on environmental issues happens with
clients, suppliers, business associations,
local governments, national/state govern-
ments, the media, environmental groups,
trade unions, and the local community. 
In total, the following relationships stand
out: 
• Those who pay attention to clients also
pay attention to suppliers – which may
suggest that some firms are rather
focused on their business partners in
environmental matters (market-driven
companies). 
• Those who pay attention to local envi-
ronmentalist groups also pay attention to
(inter)national environmentalist groups.
This is the strongest single correlation.
But there are also groups which are espe-
cially sensitive to the locality in general:
Those who pay attention to local environ-
mentalist groups also pay attention to the
local community (society-driven compa-
nies). 
• Finally, those who pay attention to the
media also pay attention to local environ-
mentalist groups. This is a quite obvious
relationship, because local environmen-
talists usually work through the media.
However, surprisingly the correlation is
weaker between (inter)national environ-
mentalist groups and the media. 
ENVIRONMENTAL STAKEHOLDER
SALIENCE 
The analyses of the factors responsible
for the extend of environmental salience is
based on firstly, a bivariate correlation
analysis and 
secondly, a multiple linear regression
analysis using the stepwise method.
Both analyses consider environmental
salience of each stakeholder as the
dependent variable and the rest of the
environmental attributes – power,
urgency, legitimacy and co-operation – as
independent variables. As can be seen in
Table 4, all bivariate correlations are pos-
itive and significant. The correlation coef-
ficients range between 0.22 and 0.67.
Obviously all stakeholder attributes influ-
ence stakeholder salience to a significant
degree. However, the attributes environ-
mental urgency and environmental co-
operation show somewhat higher average
values for almost all stakeholders than the
attributes power or legitimacy. Moreover,
values are lower for some stakeholders
(e.g. employees, suppliers) than for oth-
ers (e.g. owners, (inter)national environ-
mentalist groups, trade unions). 
The bivariate correlation analysis lends
some support to hypotheses H 1 to H 4.
The attributes environmental power,
urgency, legitimacy, and co-operation
influence a stakeholder’s environmental
salience in a positive way when all attrib-
utes are treated separately. 
Multiple linear regression analysis, in con-
trast, also takes account of possible inter-
relations between the different attributes.
The results of the regression models
applied can be seen in Table 5. The
determination coefficients (R2) range
from 0.24 for employees to 0.56 for trade
unions. Table 5 also reveals the regres-
sion coefficients in the 14 analyses per-
formed.
In order to avoid over-parametrization all
non-significant variables were eliminated
from the equations step by step (stepwise
method). In most cases only two indepen-
dent variables were sufficient to predict
the values of the dependent variable
(environmental salience) to an acceptable
degree. Power and legitimacy – though
still positive – proved to be of lesser
importance than urgency and co-opera-
tion. The latter two variables were not
excluded from the final model of any of
the stakeholders. They seem to be the
dominant predictors for environmental
salience. This result strongly supports the
hypotheses H 3 and H 4. For practically
all stakeholders, environmental urgency
stands out as having the greatest effect
on environmental salience. In all regres-
sion equations, except for owners and
employees, this attribute has the highest
coefficient. With regard to the attribute
urgency, this is very much in line with the
results of the study of Gago and Antolín
(2004) of 277 Spanish manufacturers and
the study of Agle et al. (1999) of 80 large
U.S. firms. 
The statistical support for H 1 and H 2 is
somewhat weaker, as power was only
included in the model for (inter)national
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environmentalist groups and the model
for trade unions. Environmental legitimacy
was only included in the consumers’
model. In this respect our findings differ
slightly from the study by Gago and
Antolín (2004), whose results show that for
almost all stakeholders three environmen-
tal attributes (power, urgency, legitimacy)
remain important for the manager.
However, they did not test for environ-
mental co-operation which seems to
superpose the (positive) effects of power
and legitimacy. In our case legitimacy and
power also become more prominent in the
regression equations when we exclude
the variable co-operation from the mod-
els. Models calculated without the vari-
able co-operation showed that the effect
of power became significant for owners,
clients, banks, the media, environmental-
ist groups, trade unions and the local
community. Legitimacy became signifi-
cant for owners, employees, clients, con-
sumers, suppliers, business associations,
local environmentalist groups, trade
unions and the local community. Thus,
urgency remained the most important
determinant. 
Overall, it seems that concrete, urgent
demands and the willingness to co-oper-
ate are more important to managers than
the general capacity or power of a stake-
holder to influence corporate environmen-
tal actions or the perceived legitimacy of
its claims. 
With a technique very similar to the one
that was put forward by Agle et al. (1999)
and Gago and Antolín (2004) we ana-
lyzed the joint effect of power, urgency,
legitimacy and co-operation on environ-
mental stakeholder salience. It involved
creating a new variable for each of the 14
stakeholders, which adopted five possi-
ble values (0, 1, 2, 3, 4) according to the
number of attributes given by each man-
ager. The criteria established to indicate
10 A stakeholder model in economic geography
 Environmental salience 
  Owners Employees Clients Consumers Banks 
Power 0.41*** 0.26*** 0.34*** 0.53*** 0.45*** 
Urgency 0.65*** 0.42*** 0.52*** 0.62*** 0.55*** 
Legitimacy 0.31*** 0.24*** 0.32*** 0.44*** 0.33*** 
Co-operation 0.59*** 0.37*** 0.39*** 0.55*** 0.56*** 
      
  Environmental salience 
  Suppliers 
Business 
associations 
Local 
governments 
National/state 
governments Media 
Power 0.22**   0.34*** 0.38*** 0.39*** 0.29*** 
Urgency 0.26*** 0.26*** 0.59*** 0.53*** 0.40*** 
Legitimacy 0.27*** 0.27*** 0.38*** 0.33*** 0.32*** 
Co-operation 0.48*** 0.48*** 0.48*** 0.44*** 0.40*** 
      
  Environmental salience 
  
Local 
environmentalist 
groups 
(Inter)national 
environmentalist 
groups Trade unions Local community   
Power 0.41*** 0.48*** 0.60*** 0.35***  
Urgency 0.55*** 0.62*** 0.67*** 0.60***  
Legitimacy 0.34*** 0.35*** 0.55*** 0.21***  
Co-operation 0.42*** 0.50*** 0.60*** 0.47***  
      
Significance: *** p < 0.001; ** p < 0.010; * p < 0.050   
Table 4. Bivariate correlation analysis (Spearman coefficients).
11BELGEO • 2008 • 3
  
Non-standardized coefficients   
    
B standard error t P 
Owners Constant 0.763 0.134 3.265 0.001 
F = 111.106; p = 0.000 Urgency 0.365 0.053 6.890 0.000 
R² adjusted = 0.497 Co-operation 0.421 0.069 6.074 0.000 
      
Employees Constant 2.200 0.257 8.561 0.000 
F = 38.303; p = 0.000 Urgency 0.266 0.047 5.675 0.000 
R² adjusted = 0.244 Co-operation 0.272 0.065 4.194 0.000 
      
Clients Constant 1.412 0.210 6.738 0.000 
F = 50.493; p = 0.000 Urgency 0.301 0.048 6.302 0.000 
R² adjusted = 0.305 Co-operation 0.276 0.061 4.555 0.000 
      
Consumers Constant 0.170 0.253 0.672 0.503 
F = 58.426; p = 0.000 Urgency 0.459 0.066 6.972 0.000 
R² adjusted = 0.446 Co-operation 0.216 0.073 2.962 0.003 
 Legitimacy 0.154 0.071 2.164 0.032 
      
Banks Constant 0.647 0.143 4.510 0.000 
F = 65.363; p = 0.000 Urgency 0.349 0.640 5.439 0.000 
R² adjusted = 0.379 Co-operation 0.302 0.062 4.831 0.000 
      
Suppliers Constant 1.116 0.202 5.518 0.000 
F =41.758; p = 0.000 Urgency 0.471 0.060 7.814 0.000 
R² adjusted = 0.269 Co-operation 0.181 0.069 2.618 0.009 
      
Business associations Constant 0.818 0.197 4.151 0.000 
F =62.664; p = 0.000 Urgency 0.408 0.060 6.778 0.000 
R² adjusted = 0.352 Co-operation 0.313 0.062 5.059 0.000 
      
Local governments Constant 1.155 0.206 5.608 0.000 
F =63.822; p = 0.000 Urgency 0.402 0.058 6.956 0.000 
R² adjusted = 0.350 Co-operation 0.268 0.062 3.809 0.000 
      
National/state governments Constant 1.045 0.197 5.289 0.000 
F =54.161; p = 0.000 Urgency 0.370 0.059 6.276 0.000 
R² adjusted = 0.318 Co-operation 0.216 0.065 3.299 0.001 
      
Media Constant 0.932 0.191 4.874 0.000 
F =35.978; p = 0.000 Urgency 0.343 0.070 4.931 0.000 
R² adjusted = 0.251 Co-operation 0.310 0.068 .4,591 0.000 
      
Local environmentalist groups Constant 0.370 0.170 2.178 0.031 
F =57.517; p = 0.000 Urgency 0.503 0.063 7.921 0.000 
R² adjusted = 0.357 Co-operation 0.247 0.055 4.495 0.000 
      
(Inter)national environmentalist groups Constant 0.113 0.127 0.885 0.377 
F =68.426; p = 0.000 Urgency 0.510 0.063 8.091 0.000 
R² adjusted = 0.500 Power 0.155 0.048 3.230 0.001 
 Co-operation 0.144 0.053 2.722 0.007 
      
Trade unions Constant 0.136 0.111 1.231 0.220 
F =88.791; p = 0.000 Urgency 0.373 0.062 6.021 0.000 
R² adjusted = 0.559 Co-operation 0.233 0.048 4.813 0.000 
 Power 0.212 0.051 4.109 0.000 
      
Table 5. Multiple regression analysis.
whether a stakeholder had a specific
attribute or not was the comparison
between the score given by the managers
surveyed and the mean score corre-
sponding to the 250 companies in the
sample. If a manager gave a greater than
average score to a particular attribute,
that attribute was considered important
for the particular stakeholder. The variable
that measured the accumulation of attrib-
utes for each stakeholder can have five
values ranging from 0 to 4 according to
the number of attributes with above-aver-
age scores given by the managers sur-
veyed. 
Table 6 shows the main results from the
Kruskal-Wallis test. With this analysis we
tested the equality or inequality of the
medians of the accumulated attributes in
relation to the environmental salience of
stakeholders. The results clearly reject the
H0-hypothesis that all the effects are
homogenous. In other words, there are
significant differences in the environmen-
tal salience of stakeholders depending on
the number of attributes accumulated. In
order to find out the direction of the differ-
entiating effect a bivariate correlation
analysis was performed (see Table 7).
The results show significant correlations
between stakeholder salience and the
accumulation of attributes. The coeffi-
cients range from 0.40 to 0.67, with posi-
tive values for all stakeholders indicating
a positive relation between the variables
in all cases. The results strongly support
hypothesis H 5, i.e. the enhanced stake-
holder salience theory. Moreover, they
show striking similarities to the empirical
results reported by Gago and Antolín
(2004) for 277 Spanish manufacturers
and the ones of Agle et al. (1999) for 80
large U.S. firms. The obvious similarities
between the results from different coun-
tries indicate rather robust statistical cor-
relations that are relatively independent
from national differences or differing firm
samples. 
TESTING ENVIRONMENTAL SALIENCE
FOR COMPANY- AND PRODUCT-
RELATED CHARACTERISTICS
As a next step we were interested in
determining the role of company-related
and product-related characteristics for
environmental salience. The direct effects
of selected firm variables (size, branch,
location, ISO 14001 certification etc.) and
selected product-related variables
(brands, environmental advertising) were
measured by chi square tests and by a
comparison of means (t-test) in the case
of firm size (number of employees). To
make these tests applicable, the environ-
mental salience variable was
dichotomized (0 = below average score,
1 = above average score). An overview of
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 Environmental salience 
  Owners Employees Clients Consumers Banks 
Chi square 86.258*** 40.619*** 64.538*** 90.385*** 69.876*** 
      
  Suppliers 
Business 
associations Local government 
National/state 
government Media 
Chi square 36.788*** 65.977*** 76.644*** 63.168*** 53.091*** 
      
  
Local 
environmentalist 
groups 
(Inter)national 
environmentalist 
groups Trade unions Local community   
Chi square 76.391*** 84.769*** 107.986*** 63.533***  
      
Significance: *** p < 0.001; ** p < 0.010; * p < 0.050   
Table 6. Kruskal-Wallis test in relation to environmental salience of groups defined by the
accumulation of attributes.
the results is presented in Table 8.
As can be seen from the table, the atten-
tion managers attribute to stakeholder
demands increases significantly with firm
size in the case of business associations,
national/state governments, environmen-
talist groups, trade unions and local com-
munities. Surprisingly, size does not influ-
ence the interaction with the media to a
significant degree. The reason for this
might be that larger firms have special
departments dealing with environmental
problems and environmental stakehold-
ers. For the salience of internal stakehold-
ers like owners or employees firm size is
obviously not a determining factor. The
same is true for market-related stakehold-
ers such as clients, consumers or suppli-
ers. 
The level of environmental salience also
differs between industries – especially for
clients, suppliers and environmentalist
groups. The most sensitive industries in
this regard are food processors and elec-
tricity/water supply companies. Other
important firm-related variables are loca-
tional characteristics of plants (significant
for local, state and national governments,
environmentalist groups, the media and
the local community) as well as voluntary
environmental management standards
such as ISO 14001 certifications and the
adoption of firm-specific environmental
codes of conduct (significant for business
associations, local governments, state/
national governments and trade unions).
Finally, the results show a significant rela-
tionship between environmental salience
and the fact whether a company puts
emphasis on environmental issues in
advertising (for employees and clients)
and whether it is a well-known brand
(trade unions).
COMBINING COMPANY- AND 
PRODUCT-RELATED CHARACTERISTICS
AND STAKEHOLDER ATTRIBUTES
In order to combine company- and prod-
uct-related characteristics with stakehold-
er attributes we applied logistic regres-
sion models. Logistic regressions are
basically non-linear transformations of
ordinary linear regressions. While the
dependent variable must have a binary
format, variables of all scales are accept-
ed as independent variables. In our
regression models each stakeholder’s
environmental salience (binary depen-
dent variable) is described by below-
average (0) or above-average scores (1).
The predictors (independent variables)
consisted of the four stakeholder attribut-
es (power, urgency, legitimacy, co-opera-
tion) as well as of nine company-related
and product-related variables (for defini-
tions see Table 8). Logistic regression
models were calculated for all 14 stake-
holders. Due to a stepwise exclusion of
variables, with p > 0.1, only statistically
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 Environmental salience 
  Owners Employees Clients Consumers Banks 
Accumulated attributes 0.592*** 0.404*** 0.507*** 0.614*** 0.535*** 
      
  Suppliers 
Business 
associations 
Local 
government 
National/state 
government Media 
Accumulated attributes 0.356*** 0.508*** 0.555*** 0.494*** 0.414*** 
      
  
Local 
environmentalist 
groups 
(Inter)national 
environmentalist 
groups Trade unions Local community   
Accumulated attributes 0.555*** 0.591*** 0.669*** 0.506***  
      
Significance: *** p < 0.001; ** p < 0.010; * p < 0.050   
      
Table 7. Correlation between environmental salience and accumulation of attributes
(Spearman coefficients).
relevant parameters were included. All
models were significant at the 1 per cent
level according to model chi square sta-
tistic. The percentages of correct predic-
tions were also acceptable, ranging
between 71 and 85 per cent.
The results of the logistic regression model
will not be reported in detail in this paper,
as the effects of the environmental stake-
holder attributes – especially urgency,
power and co-operation – clearly dominate
over company- and product-related
effects. Overall, stakeholder attributes
seem to be more important for environ-
mental salience than factors related to the
company and its products. Accordingly, no
clear support for hypothesis H 6 was
found. However, at least some company-
and product-related predictors proved to
be significant. Firm size, for instance, plays
a role for the environmental salience of
environmentalist groups, business associ-
ations and the local community.
Environmental advertising significantly cor-
relates to the salience of employees, local
governments, the media and clients. The
locational characteristics of the company
(urban or rural location, location in industri-
al or predominantly residential areas) are
of some importance with respect to own-
ers, local and national governments and
the media. But in general these effects are
relatively weak in comparison to the stake-
holder attributes.
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  Environmental salience 
  Test Owners Employees Clients Consumers Banks 
Size (number of employees) t-test n.s. n.s. n.s. n.s. n.s. 
Type of industry (8 industries) chi sq. n.s. n.s. n.s. related *** n.s. 
Location in residential area (yes/no) chi sq. n.s. n.s.  n.s.  n.s. n.s. 
Location type (urban/rural)  chi sq. n.s. n.s. n.s. n.s. n.s. 
Location in large core city (yes/no) chi sq. n.s. n.s. n.s. n.s. n.s. 
ISO 14001 certification (yes/no) chi sq. n.s. n.s. n.s. n.s. n.s. 
Environmental firm codes (yes/no) chi sq. n.s. n.s. n.s. n.s. n.s. 
Well-known brand(s) (yes/no) chi sq. n.s. n.s. n.s. positive * positive * 
Environmental advertising (yes/no) chi sq. positive * positive *** positive *** positive ** n.s. 
       
    Environmental salience 
  Test Suppliers 
Business 
associations 
Local 
governments 
National/state 
governments Media 
Size (number of employees) t-test n.s. positive ** positive ** positive ** n.s. 
Type of industry (8 industries) chi sq. related * n.s. n.s. n.s. n.s. 
Location in residential area (yes/no) chi sq. n.s. n.s. n.s. n.s. positive * 
Location type (urban/rural)  chi sq. n.s. n.s. n.s. positive ** n.s. 
Location in large core city (yes/no) chi sq. n.s. n.s. positive ** n.s. n.s. 
ISO 14001 certification (yes/no) chi sq. n.s. positive ** positive * positive ** n.s. 
Environmental firm codes (yes/no) chi sq. n.s. positive * n.s. n.s. n.s. 
Well-known brand(s) (yes/no) chi sq. n.s. positive ** positive * n.s. positive ** 
Environmental advertising (yes/no) chi sq. n.s. n.s. positive ** n.s. positive * 
       
    Environmental salience 
  Test 
Local 
environmentalist 
groups 
(Inter)national 
environmentalist 
groups Trade unions 
Local 
community   
Size (number of employees) t-test positive *** positive *** positive *** positive ***  
Type of industry (8 industries) chi sq. related ** related * n.s. n.s.  
Location in residential area (yes/no) chi sq. positive *** positive * n.s. positive *  
Location type (urban/rural)  chi sq. n.s. n.s. n.s. n.s. n.s. 
Location in large core city (yes/no) chi sq. n.s. n.s. n.s. n.s. n.s. 
ISO 14001 certification (yes/no) chi sq. n.s. n.s. positive ** n.s.  
Environmental firm codes (yes/no) chi sq. n.s. positive * positive * positive *  
Well-known brand(s) (yes/no) chi sq. positive * n.s. positive*** n.s.  
Environmental advertising (yes/no) chi sq. n.s. n.s. n.s. n.s.  
Significance: *** p < 0.001; ** p < 0.010; * p < 0.050; n.s. not significant 
   
   
Table 8. Interrelation between environmental salience and company- or product-related
characteristics (overview table).
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CONCLUSIONS 
In summary, our results show that man-
agers of EMAS certified companies in
Germany perceive the owners as the most
important stakeholder group with regard
to the environmental attributes power,
urgency, legitimacy, and co-operation.
Only when regarding environmental
salience or the actual interaction between
a firm and its stakeholders on environ-
mental issues, employees are evaluated
as the most important stakeholder group
by the managers. According to these
descriptive results, our study reveals an
evident difference to the results of a
Spanish study (Gago and Antolín, 2004),
which showed that the government is still
by far the most important stakeholder in
the Spanish context (as it was in some
older German studies; e.g. James et al.,
1997; Braun, 2003; for Norway see
Ytterhus, 2006). The comparison between
the results from Spain and Germany might
suggest that managers in Germany
already have a higher awareness of envi-
ronmental management issues and deal
more pro-actively than their Spanish col-
leagues, who are re-acting more on gov-
ernment policies. Overall, environmental-
ist groups rank relatively low for most
stakeholder attributes in the perspective
of company managers. This suggests that
intensive interaction between firms and
NGOs on environmental issues – although
often stressed as critical for corporate
greening in the environmental manage-
ment literature – is by far not business as
usual for German manufacturing compa-
nies. An exception to this is that some
more consumer-oriented firms which oper-
ate on environmentally sensitive markets,
mostly from the food and the water/energy
supply sector, evaluate concerns from
environmentalists and consumers signifi-
cantly higher. 
Regarding the stakeholder salience
model, our findings are surprisingly similar
to the results from the Spanish study
(Gago and Antolín, 2004). Our findings
support the stakeholder salience theory,
and very significantly support our sugges-
tion to enhance the theory by including
the attribute of willingness to co-operate.
However, it is also evident from the analy-
ses that not all attributes determine envi-
ronmental stakeholder salience to the
same degree. Environmental urgency is
clearly the strongest determinant of envi-
ronmental stakeholder salience. The prac-
tical interpretation is that firms do not pri-
marily interact with stakeholders on envi-
ronmental issues if they only regard them
as powerful or legitimate. This is indeed
surprising, as most definitions of the term
stakeholder include the element of power
or legitimacy (Mitchell et al., 1997).
Instead, it seems to be more important,
how urgent a stakeholder demand is or
can be expressed. Obviously, the con-
crete claims stakeholders raise to a firm
are the decisive drivers for a firm to inter-
act with a stakeholder. In addition, our
results also show that how a manager
evaluates the willingness of a stakeholder
to co-operate on environmental issues is
decisive. This result could be a motivation
even for stakeholders who are not very
powerful to raise environmental demands
against firms, but at the same time be
open to engage in long-term interaction.
This underlines the tendency within the
last few years to highlight the importance
of partnerships and mutual learning within
these partnerships. 
Obviously, there are limitations to this
empirical study. Firstly, respondents in a
survey tend to give answers that improve
their own image. Therefore some respon-
dents could have overestimated the envi-
ronmental attributes of some stakehold-
ers, as the environment is an issue of con-
siderable social sensitivity. Moreover, the
environment has been considered in a
generic manner without specifying partic-
ular problems. Studies on companies sub-
ject to more specific environmental condi-
tions could provide more detailed and
specific insights into the process of envi-
ronmental management.
With regard to economic geography we
suggest from our findings that economic
geographers (and environmental econom-
ic geographers in particular) should think
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